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This book reduces the extraordinarily complicated history of the Guomindang's
(GMD) rise to power in the 1920s to a contest between two impulses that evolved together
within the revolutionary movement. The party employed what Michael Murdock' labels
"dual-prong" tactics to undermine its opponents. One prong was mass organization and
anti-imperialist/anti-warlord agitation. When unleashed it could be difficult to control, but
it could also be used'to maneuver party opponents into positions of weakness relative to
the party. The other prong was accommodation: a willingness to negotiate compromises
with the party's enemies in order to take advantage of the weaknesses that mass agitation
had revealed. As Murdock amply demonstrates, party leaders were on many occasions
able to employ both prongs interchangeably, even simultaneously, fomenting mass agitation in order to pressure their enemies into seeking accommodation, and accommodating
their enemies in order to consolidate the gains they had made through agitation.
The book is aimed at countering a set of narratives about political conflict in Republican China that reduce the subject to what Murdock considers a simplistic binary code that
emphasizes left/right distinctions. This "faction-centered paradigm" has dominated standard interpretations of 20th-century history essentially because people on either side of the
Communist Party/Guomindang political divide have found it in their interests to create
narratives that present clean factional divisions. The result, Murdock argues, has been the
popular impression that the 1927 split between the left and right wings of the GMD represents the triumph of reactionary, anti-mass forces against populist activism: Chinese
Communists, their Soviet advisors, and GMD leftists pursued a revolutionary agenda that
involved mass organization and agitation, while the right wing of the party followed an
anti-communist trajectory that at times allied it with warlord and imperialist forces and led
it to oppose the masses. According to Murdock, the problem with such an interpretation is
that it assumes that the two factions had radically different agendas. In fact, however,
when viewed in the light of the tactics they used, both the left and the right were moving
toward a common objective: the construction of a strong, centralized state under one-party
domination. Both wings of the GMD had as their short-term objective the seizure of
supreme power, and each of them was capable of employing "dual-prong" tactics in order
to advance their state-building goals. Party leaders on either pole were determined to
establish their supremacy by building a strongly centralized party-state. Paradoxically,
however, both the highlyfragmentedpolitical climate and the rise of anti-foreign nationalistic sentiments that characterized life in China during the 1920s provided ample fuel for
mass agitation, and party leaders responded by using agitative tactics to maneuver their
foreign and domestic enemies into positions of weakness.
The use of agitation was always risky. Popular organizations and mass campaigns
could develop beyond party control and either provoke dangerous foreign reactions or
threaten the political and economic interests of factions on which the party depended. As
Murdock puts it, sometimes the GMD leadership seemed to be operating "with the same
precision asfirefighterstrying to manage a forest fire in shifting cross winds." (p. 284)
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Nevertheless, though they acted for the most part in an ad hoc fashion, party leaders on
the whole performed remarkably well a balancing act that required considerable skill.
Murdoch's theory rests on an assumption that in warlord China two opposing strands
of nationalism evolved side by side and mirrored the two prongs that were employed by
GMD tacticians. One strand defined the nation in narrow, exclusionary terms and seemed
designed to give party leaders tight control of the emerging state; the other was a broader,
more inclusive concept that was aimed at attracting mass support. The inclusive approach
led to mass organization and agitative tactics; the exclusive one inclined toward statist or
centralizing policies that suppressed organizations attempting to mobilize the political
energies of the people broadly defined. Politicians on either side of the left/right divide
used each of these approaches at will, with the result that in practice the state-builders
employed a complex and "unique revolutionary blend" of tactics.
The book builds on pioneering studies of John Fitzgerald and Prasenjit Duara that raise
questions about what nationalist Chinese actually meant by nationalism, and it adds significantly to work of C. Martin Wilbur, Michael Tsin, and others who have done much to
explore the party-building efforts of GMD leaders in the 1920s. Richly detailed and meticulously documented, this work adds substantially to our understanding of Republican
China's political history.
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